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Verifiable and Non-Verifiable Anonymous Mechanisms for
Regulating a Polluting Monopolist
Abstract
Optimal regulation of a polluting natural monopolist must correct for both exter-
nal damages and market power to achieve a social optimum. Existing non-Bayesian
regulatory methods require knowledge of the demand function, while Bayesian schemes
require knowledge of the underlying cost distribution. We introduce mechanisms
adapted to use less information. Our Price-based Subsidy (PS) mechanisms give the
firm a transfer that matches or approximates the incremental surplus generated each
period. The regulator need not observe the abatement activity or know the demand,
cost, or damage functions of the firm. All of the mechanisms induce the firm to price
at marginal social cost, either immediately or asymptotically.
Keywords: Surplus subsidy schemes, polluting monopolist, verifiable regulatory mecha-
nisms
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1 Introduction
Economic regulation often aims at correcting inefficiency due to firms’ market power and
the presence of externalities from production. These features of a market pull in different
directions: while market power leads to underproduction, negative externalities lead to
overproduction. In many cases market outcomes are shaped by both concentration and
externalities such as pollution, and optimal regulation of a polluting firm that has market
power is an important question. For example, energy is the largest industry in the utility
sector that is most likely to still be regulated, and the production of electricity necessar-
ily involves environmental externalities. 1 Using regulatory schemes designed to check
market power for firms that do not produce externalities, the case most often considered
in the economic regulation literature, is often inefficient.
An optimal regulatory mechanism must account for both market power and exter-
nalities, often in the presence of asymmetric information, a third inescapable feature of
many markets. The regulator is likely to have less information than the firm about pro-
duction and externality generation. For example, firms are likely to be more informed
about demand in the output market. In the presence of negative environmental exter-
nalities, firms are also likely to have more knowledge of their pollution abatement costs
and actions, and therefore the environmental damage their production causes. We focus
on such environmental externalities, and will often refer to the externality as “pollution”,
though our mechanisms can be applied in other situations where marginal private and
social costs differ.
The importance and relevance of environmental aspects of regulation has led to exam-
ination of the performance of traditional interventions in concentrated industries. Con-
cern over the social efficiency of Pigovian taxes began when Buchanan (1969) showed
the classic tax fails to achieve optimality in an imperfectly competitive market. A sub-
1Even the telecommunications industry, still usually partially regulated, is not free from externalities,
whether positive (e.g., network externalities) or negative (e.g., junk faxes, spam email, and network con-
gestion).
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stantial literature since then has focused on how to best design environmental regulatory
policy when facing markets in various stages of concentration. Further research on regu-
lating polluting monopolists through taxation includes Pigovian (Barnett, 1980) and other
(Oates and Strassmann, 1984) approaches.2
Consideration has also been given to oligopolistic settings, beginning with examina-
tion of second-best Pigovian taxes in a Cournot duopoly (Levin, 1985). Later work tackles
the design of incentive compatible regulation of oligopolistic firms when there is asym-
metric information. Regulatory instruments proposed include two-part taxes (Shaffer,
1989), ad valorem taxes (Shaffer, 1995), and surplus subsidy schemes (Kim and Chang,
1993; McKitrick, 1999). Alternative mechanisms include those designed to induce firms
to monitor each other (Duggan and Roberts, 2002) and others that work with imperfectly
rational firms (Que´rou, 2008). All of these mechanisms require at least some knowledge
of the demand and external cost functions.3
We contribute to the environmental regulation literature by proposing four anony-
mous (i.e., non-Bayesian) dynamic mechanisms for regulating a polluting natural monop-
olist with unknown costs of production and pollution reduction.4 We introduce mecha-
nisms for all combinations of cases of known or unknown demand and social damage
functions. Based on the prices a polluting monopolist sets and its actions and outcomes
from previous periods, our PS (for Price-based Subsidy) mechanisms offer the firm a
transfer that matches or approximates the incremental surplus generated each period.
Prices and abatement effort converge to optimal levels immediately or asymptotically,
depending on how much information the regulator has at hand. Some of the PS mecha-
2As an alternative to taxation in the closely related problem where the externalities arise from consump-
tion instead of production, de Villemeur and Gui (2007) propose a price cap scheme. Cavaliere (2000)
examines voluntary agreements between a monopolist and consumers concerning environmental product
quality (i.e., self-regulation) as an alternative to governmental regulation.
3Asymmetric information about abatement costs in non-monopolistic markets has been addressed with
non-Bayesian mechanisms by Kwerel (1977) and Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1980). For a further
review of environmental regulation under imperfectly competitive markets, see Requate (2005).
4The first use of the term anonymous for non-Bayesian regulatory mechanisms seems to be in Baron
(1989), although the term has an earlier history in the general mechanism design literature.
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nisms are verifiable: they make use only of realized cost, demand, and damage data. As
Vogelsang (1988) points out, verifiability is desirable for regulatory mechanisms because
it allows third parties (e.g., the courts) to ascertain whether regulation has been properly
applied. Other of our mechanisms are non-verifiable, because they assume knowledge of
the complete demand function. The anonymity of the mechanisms leads to simple rules
for regulators that are practical to implement and do not depend on characterizing un-
known parameters with probability distribution functions. We focus solely on the case
of monopoly, to make it clearer how the PS mechanisms correct for market power and
externalities, without the additional complications of strategic interactions among firms.
Extending the PS mechanisms to oligopoly is explored in the final section.
The PS mechanisms stem from the literature on the regulation of natural monopoly
with unknown costs, which can be separated into Bayesian and anonymous branches.
Bayesian economic regulation, devised for monopolists without externalities by Baron
and Myerson (1982) and furthered by Lewis and Sappington (1988b,a) and Laffont and
Tirole (1986), assumes the regulator knows the underlying cost distribution of regulated
firms. The regulator requests a cost report and gives a transfer to the firm that induces
the highest social welfare (subject to individual rationality and incentive compatibility
constraints). Bayesian approaches to regulating a polluting monopolist are proposed by
Baron (1985a,b) and re-addressed in Laffont (1994), Lewis (1996), Swierzbinski (1994), and
Bontems and Bourgeon (2005).5
In anonymous methods, such as those proposed in early work by Loeb and Magat
(1979), Finsinger and Vogelsang (1981), and Sappington and Sibley (1988), the beliefs of
the regulator play no role. Instead, the regulator uses observations on past market quan-
tities and profits to design subsidies which, when offered to the firm, result in marginal
cost pricing (there are no externalities in these models). The PS mechanisms embody a
similar approach, and do not require the regulator to have any knowledge of the under-
5Van Egteren (1996) develops a Bayesian common agency model to discusses the difficulties that arise
when the firm’s market power and the externalities it produces are regulated by different entities.
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lying cost structure of the firm.6 Despite the recent prominence of Bayesian approaches
in the theoretical literature, interest in practical uses of surplus subsidies continues, par-
ticularly as options for regulating electricity markets. In a discussion of electricity pric-
ing and performance-based regulation, Vogelsang (2006) considers both Bayesian and
non-Bayesian approaches. Gans and King (2000; 2003; 2004) consider applications to the
Australian electricity market, and provide a numerical example in which a non-Bayesian
surplus subsidy scheme can be used to induce electricity producers to engage in the so-
cially optimal level of capacity investment and transmission under nodal pricing. Tanaka
(2005) provides a numerical analysis of regulating an electricity transmission utility us-
ing a traditional non-Bayesian surplus subsidy scheme, with a direct implementation of
the surplus scheme proposed by Sappington and Sibley (1988) on which our model is
loosely based. To our knowledge, such schemes have not yet been implemented in prac-
tice. However, the PS mechanisms are members of the general class of anonymous mech-
anisms incentivizing the regulated firm to improve social welfare. This class includes “in-
centive regulation” (also known as “performance-based regulation”) such as price caps
used for public utilities. Our mechanisms thus follow in the tradition of a flourishing ap-
plied regulatory practice. As Lyon (1994) says, “[i]ncentive regulation schemes have been
applied quite extensively throughout the US in the electric utility, telecommunications,
and health care sectors. . . .”
Of mechanisms in the environmental regulation literature, the PS mechanisms are
perhaps most closely related to one proposed by Kim and Chang (1993), who modify
the Loeb and Magat (1979) (LM) surplus subsidy scheme. Whereas the LM mechanism
was designed to induce a natural monopolist to set price equal to marginal cost, Kim
and Chang’s (1993) extension allows for pollution (and oligopoly), but requires that the
regulator know the slopes of the demand and social damage functions. A subsidy is
given to each firm corresponding to its overall contribution to social welfare, which is
6In Bayesian models, the regulator typically knows the cost function up to a single parameter. Our
mechanisms have no such requirement.
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a combination of the gain from additional production and a loss due to pollution from
production.
There are two drawbacks to subsidy schemes of the LM form. Regulatory knowledge
of the slope of the market demand and social damage functions may be unrealistic. In the
PS mechanism with the fewest informational assumptions, the regulator instead bases
subsidies only on observable past outcomes for both output and environmental damage,
similar to the dynamic scheme for a non-polluting monopolist proposed by Finsinger and
Vogelsang (1981).7 When there are no externalities, two of the PS mechanisms reduce to
Finsinger and Vogelsang’s (1981) scheme. 8 Other PS mechanisms are designed to use
information on either the demand or social damage function if it is available.
Another drawback of the LM mechanism (which is essentially static) is its large sub-
sidy, which appropriates all consumer surplus each period, making funding onerous (and
implementation unpopular). The dynamic formulation of the PS mechanisms allows the
regulator to award much less information rent to the firm by removing excess profit
the period after it is earned. While our mechanisms require a subsidy (which may be
negative—a tax—if externalities are large), in the long run the per-period subsidy moves
to the minimum necessary to induce the firm to produce and is strictly smaller than the
LM subsidy in every period. In addition, the consideration of environmental externali-
ties will, in the case of a negative externality, result in an overall smaller necessary total
subsidy for reaching convergence than a similar incremental subsidy model without such
considerations. The socially optimal quantity will be lower than it would be in the ab-
sence of externalities, and the optimal quantity produced will be lower as well. As the
subsidy cost comes from enticing the firm to increase production, a strictly smaller sub-
sidy will be required to reach the smaller quantity optimum.
An obvious challenge of our mechanism is that it requires the regulator to identify
7Benchekroun and Long (1998) propose a dynamic pollution tax of a different form.
8In the working paper version of the present work (available upon request), we extend the literature and
provide a formal analysis of the phase plane, stability, and speed of convergence of the dynamical system
induced by the regulation.
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amount of pollution produced by the firm. There exist, however, various mechanisms
through which the amount of pollution created can be measured or estimated. The Toxic
Release Inventory (TRI), for example, provides annual records of toxics production for a
variety of industries at the firm level, and is made publically available by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA). For another example, in the case of electricity genera-
tion the Department of Energy records the amount of carbon dioxide (CO2) produced per
kilowatt/hour by state. Such information could be used to base damage estimates on the
production quantities that are already used for subsidy calculations.
We note that even when measuring pollution is feasible, quantifying the value of dam-
age it creates may be more difficult. Even in the model with the fewest assumptions
regarding the marginal damage function, our model assumes that, at minimum, the regu-
lator is able to accurately evaluate the cost of environmental damages, either immediately
or ex post. This is an admittedly strong assumption, as the true social cost of environmen-
tal externalities from some industries remains a constant source of debate. A practical
option in such cases would be to impose the preferences of the regulator as the “true”
social cost and have the regulator set a subsidy level accordingly. This approach fails to
achieve socially optimality if the regulator is not a benevolent social planner possessing
the necessary information. However, as long as the regulator places a reasonably accurate
valuation on environmental damage, pricing the subsidy accordingly will still move the
production outcome closer to the true social optimum.9
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the four PS mecha-
nisms. Section 3 gives numerical examples. Section 4 provides further discussion of the
model and its outcomes. Section 5 concludes.
9We thank a referee for noting this more generalized view of achieving a type of second-best outcome.
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2 The Mechanisms
Consider an economy with monopolistic and numeraire sectors, where each consumer
has quasi-linear utility separable and linear in the numeraire good. Let prices in period
t for the goods produced by a monopolist be denoted by Pt ∈ RN+ . The firm faces a
demand system Qt = Q(Pt), assumed to be twice differentiable with invertible Jacobian,
and lacking income effects. With no income effects on the monopolistic sector, a partial
equilibrium analysis is justified. Changes in consumer welfare when prices move from
Pt−1 to Pt are then measured by changes in consumer surplus, defined as the line integral
∆CSt = −
∫ Pt
Pt−1
Q · dα (1)
for any continuous path of integration α ∈ RN from Pt−1 to Pt.10 Production creates
external damages with social cost Dt. When some of the damage from the firm’s actions
in period t is incurred in the future, Dt represents the present value of the external cost
stream. We allow the firm to decrease marginal damages via a scalar abatement effort
denoted at ≥ 0, so that the total damage function D : RN+1+ → R+ is D(Qt, at), assumed
to be twice differentiable with ∇QD > 0 and ∇aD < 0.11 Abatement is costly for the
firm, so the cost function C : RN+1+ → R+ takes the form Ct = C(Qt, at), assumed to be
twice differentiable with ∇QC > 0 and ∇aC > 0. Cost and demand are stable and have
no intertemporal effects. The firm is required to supply all demand at a stated price, and
operating profits are therefore
OPt = Pt ·Q(Pt)− Ct(Q(Pt), at) (2)
10For equation (1), based on aggregate demand for the monopolist’s products, to be used as if from
a normative representative consumer, and for the line integral to be path independent, it must be that in
addition to each consumer having quasi-linear utility, income must be high enough that there are no income
effects in the relevant range of prices. Under more general assumptions on preferences, consumer surplus
only approximates actual changes in welfare.
11Our notation for derivatives ∇x f means the elements of the gradient of f pertaining to vector x.
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The firm desires to maximize the present value of future profits, given discount factor
0 < β < 1.12 Thus, absent regulation, the firm would not abate at all and would set a
monopoly price in each period.
The regulator observes prices and last period’s production quantities and profit. At
a minimum, the regulator can verify changes in damages ex post. The regulator is not
required to know the marginal damage or cost functions in any of the mechanisms. The
firm knows the cost, demand, and marginal damage functions, at least within the relevant
range of production. The discount factor β is common knowledge. Regulation begins in
period 1, and we assume that in period 0 the firm is unaware of upcoming regulation. This
assumption ensures that P0 and a0 are exogenous to the regulatory mechanism. When
the firm knows regulation is about to be imposed, it may strategically raise prices one
period prior to regulation to increase the overall subsidy provided. However, the PS
mechanisms still converge, though the process will be more costly for the regulator in
terms of total subsidy provided.
Social welfare is measured as the sum of consumer welfare (net of damage) and the
profit of the firm, and is assumed to be differentiable and to have a unique maximum. We
begin with the optimal prices and abatement levels, (P∗, a∗). Given the assumptions of
the model, optimality requires pricing at marginal social cost and equating the marginal
abatement cost with the marginal social benefits of reducing pollution in each period:13
P∗ = ∇Q(C + D)(Q∗, a∗) (3)
∇aC(Q∗, a∗) = −∇aD(Q∗, a∗) (4)
We seek mechanisms that induce the optimal quantities implicitly defined by (3) and (4),
immediately if possible or over time if not.
Four variations of such mechanisms follow. In each variation the mechanism consists
12In our discrete time model, with period interest rate r the discount factor is β = (1+ r)−1.
13We follow the conventional abuse of notation in denoting ∇x f |x=x∗ with ∇x f (x∗).
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of paying the firm a price-based subsidy. The prices the firm sets (and abatement, in some
variants) are the only current actions of the firm that affect the subsidy it receives. We
designate the mechanism PSij, where i denotes whether the demand function is known
(1) or not (0), and j denotes whether damage is observed in the current period (1) or not
(0).
When the regulator knows the demand function and can observe damage in the same
period in which it occurs, the PS11 mechanism induces the firm to price and abate opti-
mally in the first period the mechanism is imposed. If instead the regulator knows the
demand function but only observes damage with a lag, then as long as the regulator
knows the firm’s discount factor the PS01 mechanism has the same outcome. If the reg-
ulator does not know the demand function, but can observe past production quantities
(realized demand) and current damage, then the PS10 mechanism leads to convergence to
optimal outcomes over time. The PS00 variant, for when damage is observed only with a
lag, also converges to optimal outcomes. Table 1 summarizes the mechanisms.
2.1 Demand is known, damage is immediately observed
Consider first the case where the regulator knows the demand function and immediately
observes damage. With the PS11 mechanism, the regulator allows the firm to choose what-
ever price and abatement level it wishes and then pays the firm a subsidy St, where
St = ∆CSt −OPt−1 − ∆Dt (5)
The firm’s profit each period is then pit = OPt + St. The regulator calculates ∆CSt from (1),
which requires knowledge of the demand function in the region of at least one price path
between Pt−1 and Pt.14 The final term in the subsidy from the change in total damages
14∆CSt is often most conveniently calculated from the price path along the edges of the hypercube inRN
with opposite vertices Pt−1 and Pt, for then the line integral can be split into regular integrals. Let Pi,t be the
ith element of Pt and let gi(r) = (P1,t, · · · , Pi−1,t, r, Pi+1,t−1, · · · , PN,t−1). Then ∆CSt can be found from the
11
(which reduces the subsidy if output has expanded) requires that realized damage be
observed the same period it is incurred.15 The firm is thus awarded the gain in consumer
surplus, net of last period’s operating profits, and penalized for the incremental damage
caused by increased production.
Figure 1 shows how the subsidy modifies the firm’s profit in the single-good case and
gives it incentive to price at marginal social cost.16 The case where the firm’s initial price
P0 is too high (i.e., when the distortion due to market power is greater than that due
to negative externalities) is depicted, although the mechanism also works in the other
case. Given P0, the firm’s operating profit in period 1 from setting price P1 is area C +
D + E + F on the graph, less any fixed costs. Awarding the firm ∆CS1 adds A + B to
its profit. Netting OP0 from the subsidy removes A + C + E from the firm’s profit, and
also reimburses its fixed costs. Finally, penalizing the firm for incremental damage is
equivalent to charging it the sum of all marginal damages of production for units Q1
to Q0, the area between the marginal social cost (MSC) curve and the MC curve (area F).
Thus the firm’s profit in period 1 after subsidy is area B+D, which is also the incremental
addition to social welfare (consumer welfare plus profit) caused by the firm lowering its
price. The figure highlights the kinship of the PS•1 mechanisms to Sappington and Sibley’s
(1988) Incremental Surplus Subsidy (ISS) mechanism. The PS•1 mechanisms reduce to the
ISS mechanism when there is a single good and no externalities or abatement.
The firm will maximize profit by choosing a price to maximize the welfare gains,
which leads to the first-best outcome immediately:
Proposition 1. If the informational requirements for the regulator to apply the PS11 mechanism are
satisfied, then optimal prices and abatement are achieved the first period in which the mechanism
is imposed.
sum ∑Ni=1
∫ Pi,t
Pi,t−1 Q(gi(r)) dr.
15Alternatively, the regulator could also calculate ∆Dt if it knows the damage function (locally) and can
observe abatement effort.
16The figure is drawn abstracting away from the abatement dimension. Alternatively, the MSC curve can
be thought of as conditional on optimal abatement at each production level.
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The proof (see appendix) shows that as long as β < 1 the first-order conditions from
the firm’s dynamic programming problem for profit maximization match those for the
social optimum in (3) and (4). Thus welfare jumps immediately up to the first-best level
under the PS11 mechanism. The mechanism is relatively low cost, in that the firm earns no
residual profit after the first period, since the subsidy reduces to a reimbursement of last
period’s losses (if any) in periods 2 on.17 In period 1 the firm earns informational rent, the
price the regulator pays for knowing less than the firm.
2.2 Demand is unknown, damage is immediately observed
Now assume the regulator does not know the demand function, but can observe lagged
quantities sold. With the PS10 mechanism, the regulator observes the firm’s price Pt and
resulting damage from production, then pays the firm the subsidy
St = Qt−1 · (Pt−1 − Pt)−OPt−1 − ∆Dt (6)
Without knowing the demand function, the regulator cannot grant the firm the exact gain
in consumer surplus resulting from price changes. The PS10 mechanism differs from the
PS11 in that the change in consumer surplus is approximated with −Qt−1∆Pt. This is just
the difference between the ISS mechanism and Finsinger and Vogelsang’s (1981) Approx-
imate Incremental Surplus Subsidy (AISS). When there is no abatement or damage in the
model, the PS•0 mechanisms are equivalent to the AISS mechanism.18
Figure 2 shows how the subsidy transforms the firm’s profit.19 The firm’s operating
profits and incremental damage penalty are as in Figure 1. Instead of awarding area
17The firm may lose money pricing at marginal social cost price if it is a natural monopolist. However, it
may not; unlike in traditional natural monopoly regulation, the PS mechanisms do not force price down to
marginal private cost. In this case the subsidy after period 1 reduces to a tax equal to last period’s operational
gains.
18Vogelsang (1988) proposes (and Lantz (2007) refines) a surplus subsidy mechanism that is a combina-
tion of the AISS and ISS schemes. The PS mechanisms could be similarly hybridized, although we do not
pursue that approach here.
19The figure again assumes the initial price is too high and ignores the abatement dimension.
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A + B to the firm, the PS10 mechanism approximates ∆CSt with area A, which can be
calculated based on verifiable prices and quantities. The firm’s profit after subsidy is
area D, an approximation to the incremental addition to social welfare caused by the firm
lowering its price. The firm’s total profit after several periods under the mechanism is
shown in Figure 3. The firm now faces a trade-off when it decides how much to drop its
price. By taking very small steps, the firm captures more of the total surplus available
in period 1 (B + D in Figure 1). In the limit, Lemma 2.2 in the appendix shows that the
firm can capture all available surplus. However, small steps delay the accrual of surplus
to the firm, which is costly when the firm discounts the future. As with the AISS, optimal
outcomes are achieved only in the limit:
Proposition 2. If the informational requirements for the regulator to apply the PS10 mechanism
are satisfied, then optimal prices and abatement are achieved in the limit.
The proof in the appendix shows that the firm can find a sequence of prices and abate-
ment that increase its profit any time welfare is not at the maximum. Furthermore, it is not
profitable for the firm to make choices such that welfare endlessly cycles below the maxi-
mum. If the firm chooses prices and abatement that lowers welfare, it has negative profit
that period. Thus, the firm would do so only if it would create enough additional surplus
to be gained in the future to offset the current loss. When there is a global maximum
to surplus, however, there is always a price path to the optimum that strictly increases
welfare, and the firm gains nothing by ever reducing surplus. Thus the firm’s actions
cannot cause welfare to cycle or converge to a level below the maximum without the firm
forgoing additional profit.
The appendix shows that the solution of the firm’s dynamic programming problem
leads to an optimal policy function expressed as a difference equation:
∆Pt+1 =
1
β
[∇PQt]−1 ∆Qt + 1− β
β
[Pt −∇Q(Ct + Dt)] ∀t ≥ 2, β 6= 0 (7)
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The difference equation is of the second order, since Pt−1 appears on the left side through
the term ∆Qt = Qt − Qt−1. Given the quantity produced, abatement is at the optimal
level each period. That is, condition (4) holds each period t ≥ 1 with Qt replacing Q∗.
Thus optimal actions (P∗, a∗) are a fixed point of the system. Once at (P∗, a∗) for two
periods, so that ∆Qt = 0 and that (3) makes the second term on the right side of (7)
vanish, then ∆Pt+1 = 0 for all future periods.
Proof of Proposition 2 (see appendix) follows Finsinger and Vogelsang (1985). Given
an initial price P0, (7) defines the profit-maximizing prices for periods 2 and on, given P0
and P1. The determination of P1 remains. The dynamical system is saddle-path stable as
long as the damage function exhibits enough convexity.20 Therefore P1 is chosen to put
the firm on the saddle path leading toward the fixed point (P∗, a∗).
2.3 Demand is known, damage is observed with a lag
The other two mechanisms PS can be used when the regulator does not observe current
damage, but can observe it the next period. Delay in observation of damage may be due
to the time needed for emissions to diffuse in the environment or for monitoring data
to be analyzed. Since the regulator cannot observe damage in the period in which it
occurs, the firm cannot be penalized for damages incurred in period t until period t + 1.
The subsidies must therefore be adjusted by marking up the penalty so that the firm
effectively pays for past damage with interest. The forward-looking firm then treats the
upcoming penalty exactly as if it were levied in the current period. If damage costs were
not adjusted, the firm would find it profitable to converge to a price lower than MSC and
overproduce, because it would not have to bear the full present value of the damages
20We show in an earlier version of this paper that the system defined by (7) is saddle-path stable if de-
mand slopes down and social cost (the sum of private cost and damage) is linear or convex in Q. Note that
the convexity of social cost does not require convexity of private cost (as may be lacking due to economies
of scale and natural monopoly), as long as the damage function is sufficiently convex. This condition limits
the curvature of the marginal social cost when it is concave in Q. Close to the steady state, is also d by the
assumed concavity of the welfare function at its maximum guarantees convergence.
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caused. When the regulator knows the demand function, but can only observe lagged
damage, it can use the PS01 mechanism, with subsidy
St = ∆CSt −OPt−1 − ∆Dt−1/β
The regulator must know the discount factor to calculate the subsidy, and must have
observed damage for two periods. With this minor adjustment to the subsidy, the PS01
mechanism works exactly as the PS11 mechanism, and thus leads to the same outcome.
Proposition 3. If the informational requirements for the regulator to apply the PS01 mechanism
are satisfied, then optimal prices and abatement are achieved the first period the mechanism is
imposed.
The proof (in the appendix) shows that the first-order conditions for profit maximiza-
tion are identical to those for the PS11 mechanism.
2.4 Demand is unknown, damage is observed with a lag
If the regulator can observe past period quantities, prices, and operating profits as well
as current prices, knows the firm’s discount factor, and can observe total damages of past
periods, it can use the PS00 mechanism, with subsidy
St = Qt−1 · (Pt−1 − Pt)−OPt−1 − ∆Dt−1/β (8)
With this minor adjustment to the subsidy, the PS00 mechanism works exactly as the PS
1
0
mechanism, and thus leads to the same outcome.
Proposition 4. If the informational requirements for the regulator to apply the PS00 mechanism are
satisfied, then social welfare increases each period and optimal prices and abatement are achieved
in the limit.
16
The proof (see appendix) shows that the first-order conditions for profit maximization
are identical to those for the PS10 mechanism.
3 Numerical Examples
In this section, we provide numerical examples of the implementation of the PS mech-
anisms. The market parameters for the examples are chosen to approximate the retail
electricity market of Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E), a regulated electricity utility in Cal-
ifornia. In all examples, demand is linear and is calibrated so that at the actual average
price and total quantity of electricity sold in 2010, demand elasticity is −0.8.21 To keep
the examples simple and on price as the choice variable of interest, we assume that the
current level of abatement is optimal, and that optimal abatement is independent of quan-
tity.22 Under this assumption, if current abatement were not optimal, it would jump to the
optimal level immediately in period 1 under any of the mechanisms. Long-run marginal
cost is assumed to be constant at current abatement levels at $0.178/kWh.23 Marginal
damage from CO2, an air pollutant created when generating electricity from fossil fuels,
is approximated at $0.01/kWh based on PG&E pollution generation estimates and US
government estimates of the marginal damage of CO2.24
For each mechanism, four scenarios are considered. In each, the socially optimal price
21In particular, at a price of $0.183/kWh (PG&E’s actual average retail price for the second half of 2010),
quantity sold is 44.837 petaWh and the point elasticity of demand is −0.8. The elasticity estimate is the
median long-run elasticity found from the metastudy of Espey and Espey (2004).
22For example, define abatement to be the fraction of generation sources that are from renewable energy.
If we assume that renewable generation sources have a marginal cost one-third higher than non-renewable
sources in California, and that marginal cost is the weighted average of the marginal costs of renewable and
non-renewable sources, then PG&E’s current generation mix of about 70% renewable is nearly optimal.
23 Given that the long-run marginal cost estimate includes the cost of capital, and that the utility’s rate of
return on capital is regulated, fixed cost is chosen to be large enough to give the utility very little profit at
the initial price. The exact level of fixed cost is not important for demonstrating how the mechanisms work.
24PG&E states that each kWh of residential electricity consumption leads to emission of 0.52 pounds of
CO2 (http://www.pge.com/about/environment/calculator/assumptions.shtml). Estimates
of the social marginal cost of carbon varies widely. Picking a value of $42 per metric ton, well within the
range of estimates from the US government (Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon, 2010)
and other sources, leads to a marginal damage of one cent per kWh.
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is $0.188, the sum of marginal cost and marginal damage. The price in period 0 is ei-
ther the “low” value of $0.183/kWh, corresponding to PG&E’s actual average retail price
in 2010, or the “high” value of $0.295/kWh, corresponding to the monopoly price. The
former represents the case in which the environmental damage problem outweighs the
market power problem, in that prices need to rise to the social optimum. The latter repre-
sents the opposite, in that prices need to fall to attain the social optimum. For each initial
price, the interest rate can also be low (1.8%, from the annual yield on PG&E’s corporate
bonds as of mid 2011) or high (10%).
3.1 Examples when demand is known
Consider first the situation of PS•1 , in which demand is known. Since the PS
1
1 and PS
0
1
mechanisms provide identical incentives to the firm, the results for the example (shown in
Table 2) are the same regardless of which is used. Upon imposition of the mechanism, in
all cases the firm immediately sets its price to the first best level of 18.8 cents to maximize
its profit.
With a low initial price and low interest rate (the first column in Table 2), the firm
earns $12 billion in profit in present value from periods 1 on, which is $28 million less
than it would have made without the imposition of the mechanism. Since the firm was
earning little profit to begin with (see footnote 23), the profit change is relatively small.
The subsidy each period is negative (i.e., it is a tax), but relatively small, at around $−22
million per period. In the steady state, the subsidy covers the fixed cost of the firm and
reclaims the operating profits earned each period. The firm earns operating profits in this
example because the optimal price is above both average variable and average total cost.
The present value of the subsidy is $−12 billion, large enough (in this case) to reclaim
nearly all the profit for consumers.
Since quantity sold falls, the gross consumer surplus (excluding damage and tax re-
ceipts) falls compared to before the mechanism, and even when the proceeds of the tax
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are given to consumers, net consumer surplus falls by $38 million. However, social dam-
age cost falls by $55 million, and so consumers are better off. Total surplus (the sum
of gross profit and consumer surplus, less damage) improves by $14 million in present
value. Since transfers to and from the firm are assumed to be costless, the improvement
in total surplus matches what a social planner with full information could gain. The addi-
tional surplus the mechanism creates is relatively small because in this scenario, neither
the market power problem nor the externality problem is very large. In the next example,
still with the low initial price but with a high interest rate (the second column in Table 2),
results are similar but the magnitudes are smaller in present value.
With a high (i.e., monopoly) initial price (the third and fourth columns in Table 2), the
firm acts the same and earns the same gross profit as with the low initial price. However,
the firm is awarded a subsidy of $90 million in period 1 when it reduces its price from 29.5
to 18.8 cents. The subsidy in period 2 reverts to its steady state negative level, the same as
in the previous examples. Net profit is $135 billion (assuming the low interest rate) or $24
billion (assuming the high interest rate) less with the mechanism than it is in the assumed
counterfactual of continual monopoly pricing. Since quantity sold rises, there are large
gains in consumer surplus and smaller increases in damage. Total surplus increases, in
this case by much larger amounts than with the low initial price, given the large market
power problem that the mechanism corrects. The high initial price scenarios are the only
ones in which the subsidy is positive in any period. Although such transfers are assumed
to be costless, it is worth noting that with any reasonable social cost of transferring a
dollar, the improvement in total surplus of $62 billion with the low interest rate or $11
billion with the high interest rate would still be positive.
3.2 Examples when demand is unknown
Now consider the situation with the PS•0 mechanisms, which are appropriate to use when
demand is unknown. As in the previous section, the PS10 and PS
0
0 mechanisms provide
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identical incentives to the firm, so the results for the example (shown in Table 3) are the
same for both.
Comparison with the PS•1 mechanisms reveals the following. First, the firm takes
time to adjust its prices toward the optimum. The higher the interest rate (i.e., the lower
the discount factor), the quicker the profit-maximizing price path converges toward the
optimum. Second, despite the slower convergence than with the PS•0 mechanisms, the
changes in the present value of net profit, consumer surplus, damage, and total surplus
are not far from the results in Table 2. In particular, the total surplus with the PS•0 mech-
anisms is only about 6–12% less than with the PS•1 mechanisms, depending on the sce-
nario. This result highlights a strong point of the non-Bayesian approach of our mecha-
nism. Even with much less information to work with than a typical Bayesian approach
requires, the social welfare gains with the PS•0 mechanisms are not far from the gains
available under full information.
4 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the informational requirements for the mechanisms, strategic
behavior in response to the mechanisms, budgetary considerations, adverse selection is-
sues, and application of the mechanisms to dynamic markets.
4.1 Information
The informational requirements for the mechanisms are modest. The regulator need not
know the cost function facing the firm or the environmental damage function, or be able
to observe the firm’s abatement efforts (which also stand in for emissions). The PS•0 vari-
ants also remove the need for the regulator to know the demand function. We require that
the regulator be able to observe and value realized environmental damage, either contem-
poraneously or with a lag. This is a weaker assumption than that of many schemes that
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require the regulator to know the marginal or total damage function and observe emis-
sions (Shaffer, 1989; Kim and Chang, 1993; Shaffer, 1995; McKitrick, 1999; Duggan and
Roberts, 2002; Que´rou, 2008).
In most of the tax schemes cited above, firms do not need independent knowledge
of the damage function because the taxes incorporate the marginal external damage. In
our model, the firm knows the damage function (as in, for example, Duggan and Roberts
(2002)). If it does not, then our mechanisms still apply to cases where the regulator knows
the marginal damage function but cannot observe abatement or emissions, for the regu-
lator could provide the firm with information on the relationship between pollution and
incremental welfare damage. Federal agencies in the US have long attempted to quantify
the damage functions from various specific pollutants (see chieh Lui and hun Yu (1976)
for an early example of computing parametric damage functions for sulfur dioxide). The
PS mechanisms give the firm the incentive to learn these damage functions.
The PS mechanisms apply to production processes and pollutants for which the links
between production, environmental damage, and social welfare are known (or at least
reasonably well estimated). If the regulator would not know the welfare cost of the pol-
lution even if it fully observed amounts and locations (e.g., air pollution potentially con-
tributing to global warming), then the mechanisms could not be applied. We do not see
this as a limitation specific to the PS mechanisms, since if harm cannot be assessed, then
the first best cannot be determined.25
The PS0• versions of the mechanism require the regulator to know the firm’s discount
factor. Common knowledge of the discount factor is a standard assumption in the liter-
ature on dynamic games. Practically speaking, the regulator may be able to assess the
firm’s discount factor by looking at the yield on outstanding bonds the firm has on the
commercial paper market or by considering the credit rating of the firm.
25While cap-and-trade policies allow for regulation without specific knowledge of social damages, they
are designed to minimize the cost of achieving a certain level of abatement only and not to reveal the
optimal amount of pollution. As such, cap-and-trade fails to reach first-best outcomes.
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4.2 Strategic behavior
The PS mechanisms are “strategy proof” (using the language of Finsinger and Vogelsang
(1985)). In other words, when prices are above the optimum, the firm cannot profit by
raising prices just to increase the amount of future subsidies. Similarly, when prices are
too low, the firm does not profit by lowering prices to increase subsidies to come. Given
the use of dynamic programming in the solution of the firm’s problem, we have already
assumed that the firm is fully forward looking. Moving prices in the (socially) wrong
direction one period to collect larger subsidies as the prices resume converging to the
optimum is not profitable when future payments are discounted appropriately.
Furthermore, as with the ISS and AISS mechanisms, the firm’s managers will not find
it profitable to waste—that is, to produce (given a) at higher than minimum cost. We
have not formally included waste in the analysis, to avoid cluttering the model and since
the result is nearly obvious. Since cost overruns in any period are not refunded until the
next period, waste does not pay when the firm discounts the future. However, as with
the ISS and AISS, the mechanisms we propose are open to abuse—waste that provides
direct benefits to the managers or owners of the firm.26 If abuse is likely to be a problem,
Lee’s (1997) suggestion to require the firm to offer an appropriately designed menu of
self-selecting tariffs to eliminate abuse can be adapted to our mechanisms.
4.3 Application to dynamic markets and investment
To this point, the parameters of the market such as costs, demand, and abatement tech-
nology have been assumed to be stable. If the market is dynamic, with evolving fun-
damentals, then the fixed point of marginal social cost pricing becomes a moving target
and convergence of the mechanisms will be slowed. Armstrong and Sappington (2007)
point out in this regard that surplus subsidy mechanisms can impose financial hardship
26Sappington and Sibley (1993) show that the owners of the firm will limit abuse by managers to its
optimal level under the ISS. However, the owners of the firm themselves may engage in abuse if possible.
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on the firm if costs rise over time. In particular, expected, increasing costs can make the
subsidies in the initial periods insufficient to satisfy the firm’s individual rationality con-
straint. In this case, the PS mechanisms can be modified by subtracting from the subsidy
a tax of 1/β− e (where e > 0 is arbitrarily small) per dollar of operating profit earned in
the previous period. Sappington and Sibley (1988) show that so doing extracts (nearly)
all rent from the firm and (more importantly for present purposes) ensures that marginal
cost pricing satisfies the individual rationality constraint of the firm. Note, however, that
the regulator must know the discount factor (which requires no additional assumption in
the cases of the PS0• mechanisms).
When process innovation in the industry makes lower cost production or abatement
technology freely available, the firm always chooses the lowest cost technology. By lower-
ing its costs, the firm increases the amount of incremental surplus it can capture through
the subsidies. The mechanisms provide no incentive to delay adopting the new technol-
ogy. Even when access to (or innovation of) lower-cost technology requires investment
on the part of the firm, the mechanisms result in socially efficient investment levels. As
Sappington and Sibley (1988) explain, mechanisms of the PS•1 type require the firm to bear
and allow the firm to reap the social benefit of investment for exactly one period. Thus
the firm bears portion 1− β of each and the private and social incentives are aligned.
However, underinvestment is possible with the PS•0 mechanisms when demand is
unknown. The firm bears fraction 1− β of the investment cost, but can capture strictly
less than 1− β of the social benefit over time, due to the discrete approximation of changes
in welfare used. Underinvestment is greater with lower discount factors, for which less
of the social benefit is captured. Of course, underinvestment is not an outcome unique to
our mechanisms, since neither unregulated monopoly nor perfectly competitive markets
have optimal incentives to innovate in general (Arrow, 1962).
Regarding product innovation, the incentives provided by the mechanisms depend on
the treatment of the lagged price for the new good. Following Hicks (1940), it is natural to
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treat the price of the new good in the period before it is introduced (since a Pt−1 is required
to compute the subsidy) as the lowest price that would have resulted in no sales.27 In
this case, the PS•1 versions of the mechanism are equivalent to Loeb and Magat’s (1979)
mechanism for the new good market, and award the firm with full rent extraction (and
thus optimal incentives to innovate). The PS•0 mechanisms do not provide full incentive,
for the usual reason that the entire amount of surplus could only be obtained if there
were no discounting and the firm lowered price by infinitesimal steps. Again, however,
by awarding more of the surplus to the firm than an unregulated monopolist charging a
uniform price would be able to capture, these mechanisms outperform the unregulated
market with regard to product innovation.28
4.4 Other issues
The rest of this section covers a few remaining issues, including whether the mechanisms
are self-financing, whether they efficiently select firms for production, the optimality of
the mechanisms, and regulatory commitment.
4.4.1 Budget balance
The PS mechanisms share the feature with the AISS and ISS that more money may be
required to subsidize the firm than the transfer brings in to the regulator in periods in
which it is negative (that is, is a tax on the firm). Of course, as noted above our mecha-
nisms will require much less subsidy than a mechanism in the style of Loeb and Magat
(1979) since only increments to welfare are subsidized rather than awarding all surplus
27That is, for purposes of computing (5), for period t − 1 use the lowest price for the new good N + 1
such that at the actual prices for the existing goods, demand for good N + 1 is zero.
28An additional complication when the regulator does not know the demand function is that the coun-
terfactual choke price to use for good N + 1 in period t− 1 to calculate subsidy (6) will not be known. Good
N + 1 can be left out of the subsidy calculation for the period of its introduction, in the same spirit that new
services subject to U.S. federal telecommunications price regulation in the 1990s were added to the price
cap formulas only after their first year. However, then it is as if the initial price is endogenous for the new
good and the problem noted in the text following equation (2) regarding the firm’s strategic choice of P0
applies.
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to the firm each period. Furthermore, the inclusion of the adjustment in the subsidy for
increases in environmental damage also lowers the transfer from the amount it would be
under a pure AISS or ISS scheme. However, when applying the mechanisms to a natu-
ral monopoly in cases where marginal social cost pricing is not profitable, at least near
the steady state positive transfers will be required, since the subsidy converges to a re-
fund of last period’s operating losses. We do not explicitly consider the social cost of the
transfers, as does much of the Bayesian mechanism design literature, because in the U.S.
(and increasingly also elsewhere) subsidies are typically paid by consumers of the firm’s
services rather than from general tax revenue. Thus we follow Sappington and Sibley
(1988) in assuming that subsidies can be funded through two-part tariffs with a fixed-fee
component that is presumed not to affect demand.29
4.4.2 Selection of firms
Do the mechanisms efficiently select firms for production? In other words, do the mech-
anisms ensure that the firm remains in business if and only if it is socially beneficial for
it to do so? In general, as with other incremental surplus subsidy schemes, the answer
is no, because there is no way to compare the size of the subsidy with the total amount
of surplus obtained for society through production. However, when the transfers are
funded through two-part tariffs as suggested above, the maximum amount that could be
collected through the fixed fees is the net social surplus (assuming that the consumers
or ratepayers are also the population harmed by the pollution). Thus socially inefficient
production is unfundable under two-part tariffs, which signals to the regulator that the
firm should not continue to be subsidized.30
29This accords with our assumption that there are no income effects in demand.
30This argument presumes that consumers have homogeneous demand. If not, then uniform fixed fees
will cause those consumers with the lowest surplus from consumption to cease purchasing before the total
amount of revenue collected exhausts total net surplus. In this case, the ability to fund the mechanisms
through uniform fixed fees becomes a sufficient but not necessary condition for efficient selection. Efficient
selection with heterogeneous demand can be restored by treating the determination of the fixed fee for each
consumer, given the usage price, as an exercise in contributing toward the provision of an indivisible public
good (in this case, the existence of the firm). Then we could apply anonymous mechanisms such as that
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4.4.3 Optimality of the mechanisms
The PS11 mechanism also has the property that (in the absence of knowledge of the dis-
count factor and the cost function) no other Markovian mechanism that guarantees marginal
cost pricing and optimal abatement in all periods awards lower rents to the firm in peri-
ods after the first.31 The proof is as in Sappington and Sibley (1988), whose ISS mechanism
shares a similar property when there is no external damage. To ensure optimal prices and
abatement, the subsidy can differ from consumer surplus (net of external damage) only
by a constant. That constant can be no lower than what the PS11 mechanism awards in
periods 2 on.32
4.4.4 Regulatory commitment
Given that the mechanisms are dynamic, the regulator must commit to the regulatory pol-
icy over time. There are two departures from commitment that one can anticipate. The
first regards dynamic inconsistency. A complication arising under Bayesian regulation is
that the regulator, once knowing the firm reveals its true characteristics, has incentive to
renege on the regulatory contract and not allow the firm to collect information rent (Crew
and Kleindorfer, 2002). But without regulatory commitment, the firm lacks the incentive
to reveal its true type, and the Bayesian approach collapses. The PS mechanisms do not
share this challenge. When they are funded under the two-part tariffs discussed above,
the regulator cannot improve social welfare by reneging on the promised subsidy.33 Fur-
thermore, under the informational constraints assumed, the regulator has no incentive to
proposed by Jackson and Moulin (1992) to elicit from consumers their willingness to pay for access to the
good, to ensure that the project is undertaken if and only if the collective benefit outweighs the total cost,
and to collect only enough fees to cover the costs of the project.
31The mechanism is Markovian since the subsidy depends only on the firm’s action and the state in the
present period, where the latter is determined by the firm’s actions in the previous period.
32Consider subsidies of the form CSt − Dt − k that induces optimal outcomes, and let Sˆ be the lowest
subsidy S for which OP∗ + S ≥ 0. For the firm to stay in business requires CSt − Dt − k ≥ Sˆ, or k ≤
CS∗ − D∗ + OP∗ at the optimal outcomes. Inspection of the PS11 subsidy (5), evaluated at optimal prices
and abatement, shows that the subsidy is exactly CS∗ − D∗ +OP∗ in periods 2 on.
33If there is a social cost of transferring money to the firm, then the rent-extraction proposal discussed in
section 4.3 can be used to remove the incentive for ex post regulatory opportunism.
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change the proffered subsidies for future periods. In the case of the PS11 mechanism, this is
because no better Markovian mechanism exists, as discussed in the previous subsection.
The other mechanisms (for which optimality is not proven) are dynamically consistent in
the sense that if any mechanism would perform better than the PS mechanism, there is
no reason the regulator would not have adopted it in the previous period.
Another reason regulatory commitment may fail is that the regulator’s view of marginal
social cost may change due to varying political pressure, changes in other ambient envi-
ronmental conditions, or newly gained information about the impacts of the externality.
In such situations, the regulator would adjust the part of the subsidy stemming from dam-
ages, and push the firm toward the “new” equilibrium. This is the situation discussed in
section 4.3. However, such changes can be costly, because sufficient uncertainty about
future subsidies may lead to unpredictable actions on the part of the firm. The difficulties
of long-term commitment in both Bayesian and non-Bayesian regulatory mechanisms are
discussed in greater detail in Vogelsang (2006).
5 Conclusion
If a monopolist’s production results in externalities, application of either regulatory meth-
ods for competitive polluting firms or mechanisms for non-polluting natural monopoly
will yield socially suboptimal output levels. We introduce four mechanisms to regulate
an externality-producing monopolist that are easier to implement than prior mechanisms.
Unlike Bayesian regulatory methods, the PS mechanisms do not require that the regula-
tor have any knowledge of the firm’s cost function or underlying cost distribution. Our
mechanisms also advance the literature on anonymous regulation for polluting firms by
reducing the size of the subsidy given to the firm and not using information about the en-
tire demand curve. In the mechanism requiring the least information, the regulator need
know only fully observable and verifiable outcomes from prior periods and the discount
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factor of the firm.
The proposed mechanisms should not be applied blindly without careful investiga-
tion of the particular market to ascertain whether the required assumptions hold. Just as
with cap-and-trade plans or price cap regulation of public utilities, the simple, elegant
theoretical mechanisms may need to be expanded in practice. What can be expressed
with a few equations in the sterile laboratory of the theorists’ model often ends up as
hundreds of pages in the bureaucrat’s regulations, and no doubt more research will be
needed to bridge the gap between theory and practice.
A natural extension of the mechanisms would be to oligopoly. The PS•1 mechanisms
can be extended as in Schwermer (1994) or Kim and Lee (1995), who modify the ISS mech-
anism for Cournot oligopoly without environmental externalities. If only total damage is
observed each firm must be assessed the entire incremental damage, which may lead to
inefficient exit decisions. If the damage function is known, the information can be used
to penalize each firm for only its contribution to incremental damage, as in Kim and
Chang’s (1993) nonlinear pollution tax. The extension of the PS•0 mechanisms to oligop-
oly are more difficult to analyze, since each firm must consider not only how its actions
today affect its future subsidy, but also how other firms will respond to its actions. As
an additional consideration, Benchekroun and Ray Chaudhuri (2008) show that dynamic
pollution taxes can help sustain collusion. Moving from monopoly to oligopoly takes the
firm’s problem from decision theory to game theory, making it beyond the scope of this
article. We intend to pursue such exploration in future work.
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Appendix
A-1.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The firm’s profit stream, discounted with factor β and expressed as a function of choice
variable sequences x = (P, a), where P = {Pt}∞t=0 and a = {at}∞t=0, has present value
Π(x) = OP0 +
∞
∑
t=1
βtpit (A-1)
where x0 = (P0, a0) is assumed to be exogenous. Define period profit to be
pi(xt, xt−1) = OPt + St = OPt + (∆CSt −OPt−1 − ∆Dt) (A-2)
= Pt ·Q(Pt)− C(Q(Pt), at) + ∆CS(Pt, Pt−1)
− [Pt−1 ·Q(Pt−1)− C(Q(Pt−1), at−1)]
− [D(Q(Pt), at)− D(Q(Pt−1), at−1)]
Note that profit is a function of the previous period’s prices and abatement through the
subsidy. Thus the firm’s choice of xt affects that period’s operating profit and subsidy,
along with next period’s subsidy. The terms in Π(x) relevant to the firm’s decision at t
are
Lt = pi(xt, xt−1) + βpi(xt+1, xt) (A-3)
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The first order conditions to maximize (A-3) with respect to xt (where C, D, P, and Q are
treated as column vectors), after noting that ∇Pt∆CS = −Qt,34 are
∇PtLt = Qt +∇PQt
(
Pt −∇QCt
)− (Qt +∇PQt∇QDt)
+ β
{
Qt −
[
Qt +∇PQt
(
Pt −∇QCt
)]
+∇PQt∇QDt
}
= (1− β) [Pt −∇Q (Ct + Dt)] = 0
⇒ Pt = ∇Q (Ct + Dt) ∀t > 0, β < 1 (A-4)
We use the notation ∇xy to mean the matrix with element ∂yj/∂xi in row i and column
j. Equation (A-4) implies that at P∗t price is set equal to marginal social cost, the sum of
marginal private cost and marginal damages. The first order condition with respect to at
is
∇atLt = − (1− β)∇a (Ct + Dt) = 0
⇒ ∇aCt = −∇aDt ∀t > 0, β < 1 (A-5)
At a∗t , the marginal private cost of abatement is equal to marginal social benefits of abate-
ment.
A-1.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The working paper version of the present work (available upon request) contains a proof
that the dynamical system defined by (7) is saddle-path stable and converges to the social
optimum as long as the damage function exhibits enough convexity. In particular, it can
be shown that saddle-path stability obtains if (in addition to assumptions already noted
in the text) demand slopes down and social cost (the sum of private cost and damage) is
linear or convex in Q.
34The equality follows from the lack of income effects and Roy’s identity, or directly from a fundamental
theorem of line integrals (Apostol, 1969, p.338)
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However, instead of following a purely abstract approach relying on the theory of
difference equations, here we adapt Finsinger and Vogelsang’s (1985) proof of conver-
gence of their mechanism to our setting. This alternative proof of convergence provides
intuition regarding some important features of the mechanism, as discussed in the text.
Given our focus on the intuition behind the mechanism, in a few places below we refer
the reader to various other work by Finsinger and Vogelsang for proofs of some technical
details. Given a reference price P0, define consumer surplus (not including damage) in a
period as
V(P) =
∫ P0
P
Q · dα
for any continuous path of integration α ∈ RN from P to P0 . Using V(P) as if from a
normative representative consumer is the same as assuming that each actual consumer
has quasi-linear utility35 and there must be no income effects in the relevant range of
prices. Define social welfare as W(P, a) = V(P) +OP(P, a))− D(Q(P), a), where OP is
as defined in (2) and D is the damage function as in the text. First, note that the welfare
gains from a series of the firm’s choices are always higher than the undiscounted sum of
the subsidy payments:
Lemma 1. With no discounting, the welfare gains always outweigh the subsidies and operating
profits. For any j, k ∈N, k ≥ j, and any sequence {ai}ki=j−1, we have
W(Pk, ak)−W(Pj−1, aj−1) ≥
k
∑
t=j
pit. (A-6)
Proof: The lack of income effects implies that V is convex (Vogelsang and Finsinger,
1979, see). Since ∂V/∂P = −Q, V(Pi)− V(Pi−1) ≥ Q(Pi−1)(Pi−1 − Pi). Adding ∆OPi −
35Utility need not be identical among consumers, but the marginal utility of income must be constant and
identical for all (see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green, 1995, p. 119).
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∆Di to both sides gives ∆Wi ≥ pii (see equation (A-12) below to explain the right side of
the inequality), which holds for any (ai−1, ai). So
W(Pk, ak)−W(Pj−1, aj−1) =
k
∑
t=j
∆Wt ≥
k
∑
t=j
pit  (A-7)
Lemma 2. The firm can:
1. increase its profit whenever it is possible to increase welfare; for any differentiable path
x(t) = (P(t), a(t)), t ∈ [0, 1], such that W(x(t)) is strictly increasing in t, there exists a
sequence {xi}ki=0, with x0 = x(0), xk = x(1), such that Πk(β) = ∑ki=1 βi−1pi(xi) > 0;
and
2. appropriate all welfare gains in the limit by changing prices by ever-smaller amountsthe
discretization of the path x(t) becomes finer; limk→∞Πk(0) = W(x(1))−W(x(0)).
Proof: Because ∂V/∂P = −Q, we have
V(p(1))−V(p(0)) = −
∫ P(1)
P(0)
Q · dP = −
∫ 1
0
Q(P(t)) · p˙ dt
= lim
k→∞
k
∑
i=1
−Q(P(ti)) · [P(ti)− P(ti−1)]
where the first equality follows from the second fundamental theorem of calculus for line
integrals (Apostol, 1969, p. 334), the second from the definition of the line integral, and
the third from the definition of integrals, assuming that {ti}ki=1 is a partition of [0, 1]. Thus
for every ε > 0 there exists an m such that for all k ≥ m,
∣∣∣∣∣[V(p(1))−V(p(0))] +
[
k
∑
i=1
Q(Pi) · (Pi − Pi−1)
]∣∣∣∣∣ < ε (A-8)
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Adding (OPk − Dk)− (OP0 − D0) to both expressions in brackets implies∣∣∣∣∣W(x(1))−W(x(0))− k∑i=1pii
∣∣∣∣∣ < ε (A-9)
Lemma 1 implies that the expression inside the absolute value bars on the left side of
(A-9) is non-negative, and so
k
∑
i=1
pii ≤W(x(1))−W(x(0)) <
k
∑
i=1
pii + ε (A-10)
thus proving part 2 of the lemma. Furthermore, note that (A-10) along with the mono-
tonicity of W on x(t) implies that for a sufficiently fine partition, ∑ki=1 pii > 0. This implies
that there is a partition for which pii is positive for all i. If not, then there is always a pij < 0
no matter how large k is. Since pij = ∆OPj − Qj−1 · ∆Pj − ∆Dj] (see equation (A-12) be-
low), (A-8) implies that pij can be made arbitrarily close to ∆Wj. However, recall that xj
is constructed from partition {ti}ki=1, and that W is monotonic on x(t). It cannot be that
pij is negative but W is monotonic. Since k can be found such that pii > 0 ∀i, part 1 of the
lemma follows. 
Lemma 3. Welfare converges to its maximum. {W(xt)}∞t=1 →W∗ = maxx W(x).
Proof: If not, then define W¯ = lim sup{W(xt)}∞t=1. Then unless Wt cycles endlessly
below W¯, which lemmas III and IV of Finsinger and Vogelsang (1982) show cannot be
profitable, Wt → W¯ and the firm eventually can gain only an arbitrarily small amount of
additional profit, per Lemma 1. Since W is assumed to have a unique maximum, there is
a differentiable path x(t) such that W(x(t)) is strictly increasing in t (starting near W¯ and
ending at W∗), and so part 1 of Lemma 2 implies that the firm is leaving additional profit
unearned, which cannot be optimal. 
To complete the proof of Proposition 2, note that with a unique maximum, there is
a unique x∗ = arg maxx W(x). The absence of non-global maxima in welfare simplifies
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the proof but is not essential. See Finsinger and Vogelsang (1982) for the additional steps
needed to prove convergence in the absence of concavity.
A-1.3 Derivation of the Policy Function for the PS10 Mechanism
Under mechanism PS10 profit in (A-2) becomes
pi(xt, xt−1) = OPt + St = OPt + [Qt−1 · (Pt−1 − Pt)−OPt−1 − ∆Dt] (A-11)
= ∆OPt − [Qt−1 · ∆Pt + ∆Dt] (A-12)
which can be written as
pi(xt, xt−1) = Pt ·Q(Pt)− C(Q(Pt), at)− [Pt ·Q(Pt−1)− C(Q(Pt−1), at−1)]
− [D(Q(Pt), at)− D(Q(Pt−1), at−1)]
The first order conditions to maximize (A-3) are now
∇PtLt = Qt +∇PQt
(
Pt −∇QCt
)− (Qt +∇PQt∇QDt)
+ β
{
Qt −∇PQt∆Pt+1 −
[
Qt +∇PQt
(
Pt −∇QCt
)]
+∇PQt∇QDt
}
= ∆Qt + (1− β)∇PQt
[
Pt −∇Q (Ct + Dt)
]− β∇PQt∆Pt+1 = 0
⇒ ∆Pt+1 = 1
β
(∇PQt)−1 ∆Qt + 1− β
β
[
Pt −∇Q (Ct + Dt)
]
∀t ≥ 2, β 6= 0 (A-13)
which is the law of motion (7) in the text. Note that the first term on the right side uses
the assumption that the Jacobian of the demand system is invertible (or, equivalently, that
the Hessian of consumer welfare is nonsingular). The first order condition for abatement
is the same as in (A-5).
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A-1.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Under mechanism PS01 profit in (A-2) becomes
pi(xt, xt−1, xt−2) = OPt + St = OPt + (∆CSt −OPt−1 − ∆Dt−1/β)
= Pt ·Q(Pt)− C(Q(Pt), at) + ∆CS(Pt, Pt−1)
− [Pt−1 ·Q(Pt−1)− C(Q(Pt−1), at−1)]
− [D(Q(Pt−1), at−1)− D(Q(Pt−2), at−2)]/β
Since the subsidy two periods ahead is affected by actions in t, an extra term is added to
(A-3):
Lt = pi(xt, xt−1, xt−2) + βpi(xt+1, xt, xt−1)+?2pi(xt+2, xt+1, xt) (A-14)
The first order conditions to maximize (A-14) are
∇PtLt = Qt +∇PQt
(
Pt −∇QCt
)−Qt
+ β
{
Qt −∇PQt∆Pt+1 −
[
Qt +∇PQt
(
Pt −∇QCt
)]−∇PQt∇QDt/β}
+ β2∇PQt∇QDt/β
which match those in (A-4) exactly. Thus the mechanism induces exactly the same behav-
ior from the firm as does the PS11 version.
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A-1.5 Proof of Proposition 4
Under mechanism PS00 profit in (A-2) becomes
pi(xt, xt−1, xt−2) = OPt + St = OPt + [Qt−1 · (Pt−1 − Pt)−OPt−1 − ∆Dt−1/β]
= Pt ·Q(Pt)− C(Q(Pt), at)− [Pt ·Q(Pt−1)− C(Q(Pt−1), at−1)]
− [D(Q(Pt−1), at−1)− D(Q(Pt−2), at−2)]/β
and the period-specific maximand is as in (A-14).The first order conditions to maximize
(A-14) are now
∇PtLt = Qt +∇PQt
(
Pt −∇QCt
)− (Qt +∇PQt∇QDt)
+ β
{
Qt −∇PQt∆Pt+1 −
[
Qt +∇PQt
(
Pt −∇QCt
)]−∇PQt∇QDt/β}
+ β2∇PQt∇QDt/β
= ∆Qt + (1− β)∇PQt
[
Pt −∇Q (Ct + Dt)
]− β∇PQt∆Pt+1 = 0
which match those in (A-13) exactly. Thus the mechanism induces exactly the same be-
havior from the firm as does the PS10 version.
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Table 1: The price-based subsidy mechanisms
Demand Output observed
function known with lag
Damage observed immediately
PS11 PS
1
0
(immediate (asymptotic
convergence) convergence)
Damage observed with lag
PS01 PS
0
0
(immediate (asymptotic
convergence) convergence)
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Figure 1: The firm’s profit under the PS11 mechanism
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Figure 2: The firm’s profit in one period under the PS10 mechanism
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Figure 3: The firm’s profit over time under the PS10 mechanism
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